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ABSTRACT
One of the most pervasive and recurrent issues that legal theory has
had to deal with is the very concept of law. And one of the most
puzzling questions that cyberspace lawyers have been jacing is where
and in which form law is to be found on the Internet. This essay seeks
to build a bridge between these two issues. The main argument is that,
on the Internet and more specifically in the context of eBay (the online
marketplace) and with regard to certain aspects of domain names,
private spheres of normativity may be found that deserve to be
considered as the epitome ofprivate legal systems more so than the lex
mercatoria. These systems provide fertile ground to test some of the
most classical issues regarding the concept of a legal system and
thereby to reflect on the essential features of law. This Article is thus a
discussion of legal pluralism based on examples provided by the
Internet. These particularly revealing examples are used to shed some
light on issues such as the distinction between social and legal norms,
the autonomy of a legal system, and law's supposed features of
supremacy, territorial exclusiveness and comprehensiveness.
. Senior Research Fellow, Faculty of Law. Geneva University. This Article was
written during a postdoctoral research stay at the Lauterpacht Research Centre for
International Law, Cambridge University, 2005-2006. The Swiss National Science
Foundation and the Holcim Foundation for the Advancement of Academic Work
provided support for this research. The author wishes to thank Professor Matthew
Kramer for his invaluable guidance in preparing this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal theorists often see the last decade's wealth of reflections
on law and the Internet as barely more than a passing intellectual fad,
as some young people's agitation that they should and eventually will
grow out of, and they feel that the whole idea of a virtual online world
is against the natural order of things. Cyberlaw devotees, on the other
hand, have a tendency to see their field as so new, so exciting, so
revolutionary, and so likely to give them a career, that they are entitled
not to bother with many of the classical ways we think about law, and
especially the more complicated ways of thinking about it. This is
unfortunate because the Internet offers new examples of law's
normativity, which may enrich legal theory, while legal theory can
look back to centuries of conceptual developments that may help
cyberlawyers handle their challenges with shifting power structures
and modalities of control. In particular, it would seem relevant, if not
critical, for legal theorists to look to the Internet to see how such new
fundamental developments in the law may illuminate the way we think
of legal systems. It also would seem relevant, if not vital, for those
concerned with the governance of cyberspace, who reflect on how
Internet activities are, can and should be regulated, to look to classical
legal theory to start from fundamental reflections about what law and a
legal system are. However, these relationships have hardly been
touched upon.
Admittedly, many assertions have already been made about the
existence of non-state law on the Internet.' Nevertheless, anyone
making such a claim - that there is law outside the state - bears the
burden of proof of what law might be when it is unconnected with
government and where it may then be found.2 This burden is not yet
I This is in substance the argument of the lex electronica being the equivalent for the
Internet of the lex mercatoria. For more on the concept of the lex electronica, though
sometimes with a different terminology, see, for example, VINCENT GAUTRAIS, LE
CONTRAT ELECTRONIQUE INTERNATIONAL ENCADREMENT JURIDIQUE 23 (2002);
Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational
Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 75, 102, 108 (1996); William S. Byassee,
Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual
Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 219-220 (1996) (mentioning the
"separat[ion] of cyberspace into an autonomous jurisdiction"); Henri Farrell, Hybrid
Institutions and the Law: Outlaw Arrangements or Interface Solutions?, 23
ZEITSCI-RIFT FOR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 25 (2002); Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal
Regime for 'Cyberspace', 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1021 (1994); David R. Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1367, 1389 (1996); Gunther Teubner, Constitutionnalisme socital et globalisation:
alternatives i la th'orie constitutionnelle centrde sur l'Etat, 39 REVUE JURIDIQUE
THtEMIS 435, 454 (2005); Leon Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-
Merchant Lawv, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 265 (2003); Pierre Trudel, La lex electronica, in
LE DROIT SAISI PAR LA MONDIALISATION 221, 231 (Charles-Albert Morand ed. 2001);
Edward J. Valauskas, Lex Networkia: Understanding the Internet Community, 1
FIRST MONDAY, no. 4 (1996), available at http://www.webcitation.org/501UFPZ7H.
2 This is the central argument in Simon Roberts. After Government? On Representing
Law Without the State, 68 MOD. L. REv. 1. 18 (2005) (rejecting the idea of law
outside the state because of the difficulty of such a definition).
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met, or at least not met fully, by those who have previously made
claims of the existence of non-state law on the Internet. This Article,
then, seeks to do just this: come up with a workable definition of law
for legal systems outside the state, apply this definition to two
particular instances of normative systems on the Internet, and see what
we can learn from it. Seen from a different perspective, the Article
combines a central theme of cyberspace regulation, namely the idea of
transnational private orderings, and a central theme of legal theory,
which is the question of the identity of a legal system.
In this regard, one of the main findings of the Article is that there
exist private systems on the Internet that are much more clearly legal
systems than some of the prime examples provided by legal pluralists.
The lex mercatoria is portrayed by some of the most respected
scholars in the field of legal pluralism as "the most successful example
of global law without a state," 3 as the epitome of a private legal
system. Unfortunately, the lex mercatoria is confronted with what
appears to be a decisive criticism, insofar as its characterization as a
legal system is concerned: it still needs to rely on national courts for
enforcement. 4 As Simon Roberts would say, its "legality is routinely
secured from underneath, 'downwards' into the state, as it were."5 The
lex mercatoria can therefore only have the contents that national courts
allow it to have.6 Assuming that only efficacious rules matter, the final
and decisive rule of recognition determining which rules of conduct
belong to the lex mercatoria is in the hands of national courts, of the
public legal system. The situation is different with regard to the legal
systems on the Internet that are envisaged here; they rely on their own
enforcement structures. Two such systems are considered in this
Article, both because of their significance for the regulation of
cyberspace and the clarity with which they realize the conditions
meant to be demonstrated here: one relates to the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the regulation of
domain names; the other is eBay's system for regulating electronic
transactions.
My hope in examining these two systems is twofold. First, I
mean to contribute to our understanding of what private legal systems
are, and where and how they may operate. For this purpose, much of
this Article will be spent addressing some of the main objections to the
recognition of private normative systems as legal systems, as they are
raised by the instances considered here. In this respect, much attention
will be given to departing as little as possible from the analytic scheme
3 Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
4 See, e.g.. Lawrence M. Friedman, One World: Notes on the Emerging Legal Order,
in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 23, 31, 33 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).
5 Roberts, supra note 2, at 18.
6 See, e.g.. 1 CHRISTIAN VON BAR & PETER MANKOWSKI, INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 81 (2d ed. 2003).
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commonly used to ground legal positivism (in the sense of its monistic
construction of law, as opposed to legal pluralism), in order to remain
close to the conception of law we rely on when thinking about law
with the public legal system in mind. This is done in order to avoid or
at least to minimize one fair concern frequently raised against radical
pluralism, which consists of claiming that it is simply not informative
enough about the difference between law and social orders. Second, I
hope to explain what the sources of regulation in certain contexts of
cyberspace are and to examine what regime concretely determines the
rights of people in certain situations, in the sense of describing what
normative system will determine the final situation of the parties after
a dispute. This will show that, in certain cases, it is not the public legal
system, but a private one, that will determine this. To reach this
conclusion, this Article follows the idea that sometimes, to answer the
question of what the law is on a particular issue, one needs to first
answer the question of what law is in general terms.
Labeling specific normative systems as either legal systems or
mere social orderings matters because at least two consequences flow
from it. The importance of law resides in the fact that its every
incarnation carries with it certain qualities that we have come to
associate with and expect from that which is jural. First, the label of
law implies the recognition of a certain power structure, a structure
that includes a high degree of autonomy and regulatory sway on the
part of the system qualified as legal. Qualifying a normative order as
law elevates it, in certain respects, to a level where it can be compared
with state law - the epitome of a legal system - in terms of regulatory
power: any instance of law is a regime of effective governance that is,
to a large extent, autonomous or self-contained and, for its greatest
part, not hierarchically submitted to any other normative system. 8 As
Joseph Raz writes, "There can be human societies which are not
governed by law at all. But if a society is subjected to a legal system
then that system is the most important institutionalized system to
which it is subjected." 9 Yet law is not only a question of power. The
label of law also triggers certain legitimate expectations with regard to
the quality of the governance that a legal system effects. These
qualitative expectations derive from the fundamental attributes of the
rule of law, which Lon Fuller called the "inner morality of law" - for
example, predictability, publicity, non-retroactivity, understandable
7 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 2, at 8.
8 This feature of law is what the concept of supremacy encapsulates and it is the true
issue behind the debate about law's presence outside the state. To admit that there are
legal systems outside the state is to recognize that there are communities in this world
that are, with respect to some parts of their activities, not submitted to the state. This
fear that such systems would thus escape from the control and guarantees of the state
is one fear of classical legal positivism, expressed by Duguit and Kelsen: "There is
no other justice than the justice to be found in the positive law of states." LEON
DUGUIT & HANS KELSEN, Foreword to 1 REVUE 1NTERNATIONALE DE LA THtORIE DU
DROIT 3 (1926-1927).
9 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 154 (1999).
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character of the commands, non-contradiction, compliability,
steadiness over time, and consistency in the application of norms.10 As
Matthew Kramer suggests, respect for the attributes of the rule of law,
which are expressive of a moral-political ideal, guarantees the
normative system's adherence to liberal-democratic values.'' These
latter consequences that flow from the label of law (the attributes of
the rule of law) are a corollary of the former consequences (the
recognition of the regulatory power); simply put, the more effectively
a normative system regulates, the higher its standards must be. To
qualify a given normative system as law matters, thus, because it
earmarks the system as having a certain regulatory importance and,
consequently, warns us that we should demand certain regulatory
standards from such a system.
My Article moves in five parts. I begin with a presentation of the
two legal systems on the Internet already mentioned. Then I try to cut
to the heart of the issue addressed, which is the distinction between
legal systems and mere social orderings; this is done through relying
on the work of Norberto Bobbio and Paul Bohannan with regard to the
progressive secondarization of norms, people and institutions in a
normative system's progressive evolution from social to jural. This
progressive evolution then leads me to address the question whether
law is itself of a scalar or a dichotomous quality, to determine if a
normative system may become increasingly jural, or if it acquires the
quality of law and subsequently only becomes more clearly a legal
system. After that, I rely on the concepts of prescriptive, adjudicative
and enforcement jurisdictional powers as revealing factors of
juridicity. The Article then ends by addressing the question whether a
normative system that has no claims to comprehensiveness and
supremacy, and that lives within and across other legal systems, can
still be a legal system. It reaches the conclusion that ICANN and eBay
are indeed some of the places on the Internet where normative systems
can be found that are so autonomous and formally organized, and that
display the essential features of a legal system to such a high degree,
that they deserve to acquire the status of archetypes of non-state law.
I. Two NORMATIVE SYSTEMS ON THE INTERNET
To say that private orderings abound on the Internet is a claim
that is neither truly novel nor especially exciting. After all, private
orderings abound just as much outside the Internet, and they regulate
us in our daily offline activities. Wherever there is a community, there
is a private ordering, which means there are norms, in the sense of
"standard[s] with which conformity is required and against which
people's conduct can be assessed" that form a "touchstone for guiding
10 See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-41 (rev. ed. 1969).
11 See MATTHEW H. KRAMER, OBJECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 102 (2007)
[hereinafter KRAMER, OBJECTIVITY].
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and appraising human conduct". 12 The place I work at, the house I live
in, the bar I have drinks at, the academic communities I am part of, my
family, my group of friends, etc., all have formed rules that I have
prudential, and sometimes moral, reasons to obey. Just the same,
online communities (people gathering on the Internet with shared
interests to engage in the same or closely related activity) frequently
have their own rules, which may lead, in case of violation, to social,
economic and technological sanctions. 3 I could endure criticism or
slating, disparagement or ostracism. I may be prevented from
participating in certain profitable deals normally concluded within this
online community. And technological code, which is an unavoidable
element of the feasibility of activities on the Internet, may be used as a
sanction against me, for instance by denying me access to a given
website, database or other information system. 14 In sum, cyberspaces
(in the plural) frequently have their own private rules. This, as I have
suggested, is neither very controversial nor particularly surprising.
What may be less obvious is the observation that, in some
situations, such private orderings acquire a remarkable degree of
formal organization. It is precisely this formal organization that allows
them, as I will contend in the balance of this Article, to become legal
systems. Hence, the purpose of the present section is to describe the
organization - the general structure and functioning - of two such
normative systems. The first one relates to certain types of domain
names; the second one is eBay.
A. Domain Names
Domain names, such as nytimes.com, are the identifying names
for Internet addresses. They are the identifying names, and not the
addresses themselves, because the latter are made up of numbers,
called IP addresses. When a domain name is entered into a Web
browser (such as Internet Explorer, Netscape or Firefox), the browser
obtains the corresponding IP addresses from a database and then
connects to the corresponding server, on which the contents of the
website in question are hosted. Without this conversion of the domain
name into the IP address, the browser will not be able to access the
website. This conversion database, insofar as it relates to generic and
international domain names, 15 as well as certain national domain
names, 16 was first controlled by a single man, Jon Postel, one of the
12 MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 80 (1999) [hereinafter
KRAMER, IN DEFENSE].
13 See, e.g.. PAUL VIRILIO, THE INFORMATION BOMB 99 125 (2000).
14 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 340 345 (2d ed. 2006).
15 More precisely, the domain names concerned are those ending in biz, .com, info,
.name, .net, .org, aero. .coop, .jobs, travel and .museum. which represent the
majority of domain names in the world.
2007-2008
7
SCHULTZ: PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEMS
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEMS
fathers of the Internet itself. He regulated the attribution of domain
names in an informal manner, on the basis of "rough consensus," in
global accordance with the Internet community's general
understandings of how this regulation should be accomplished. Due to
the increasing complexity and quantitative importance of the
management of the domain name system, it was later transferred to a
private non-profit corporation based in California, called the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
17
In 1999, ICANN introduced a specific dispute resolution
mechanism, applicable to all the domain names it controls: the
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). The main
objective of the UDRP was to fight cybersquatting, which is in essence
the practice of registering a domain name very similar to a trademark
for the purpose of subsequently offering it to the trademark holder at
an extortionary price. The UDRP sought to introduce a low-cost,
effective and simple procedure for disputes between trademark holders
and domain name holders.
On the basis of the UDRP, a trademark owner may challenge a
purportedly infringing domain name, wherever her trademark is
registered. To obtain the transfer of the domain name or its
cancellation, the trademark holder must file a complaint with one of
four ICANN-approved institutions.' 8 In addition, the trademark holder
must show that certain conditions contained in the UDRP itself are
met, namely that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar
to the complainant's trademark; that the domain name holder has no
rights or legitimate interests in the domain name; and that the domain
name was registered and is used in bad faith.19
If the complainant demonstrates that these conditions are met,
the dispute resolution panel in principle will order the domain name to
be either transferred to the complainant or, in exceptional cases,
cancelled. This decision is implemented through technological means
by the registrar - the firm approved by ICANN that contracts with
clients to register domain names in a central database - of the domain
name in question. To implement the decision, the registrar changes the
association between the domain name and the IP address, which
prevents the domain name from being resolved into the original IP
address. Instead of connecting to the server containing the contents of
the website of the respondent, all web browsers then connect to the
server hosting the complainant's website. The respondent's website
16 For example, those ending in .ve (Venezuela), .pr (Puerto Rico), .gt (Guatemala),
.tv (Tuvalu), etc.
17 See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 33-46,
168 171 (2006).
18 These four institutions are the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); the National Arbitration Forum (NAF);
the Institute for Dispute Resolution of the Center for Public Resources (CPR); and
the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Center (ADNDRC).
19 See UDRP, Para. 4(a); see also UDRP RULES, Para. 3(b)(ix).
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effectively becomes invisible. In order to be able to change this
association in ICANN's database, the registrar must have been
approved by ICANN. Only on one condition is the decision in
application of the UDRP not implemented by the registrar: the
respondent must show, within ten days after the UDRP decision is
handed down, that he has commenced a lawsuit in certain
jurisdictions.20 This, however, is an exceptional occurrence: it is
estimated to occur in less than one percent of all cases.21 In almost all
cases, disputes submitted to the UDRP are resolved by an ICANN-
approved panel applying rules contained in the ICANN-adopted
UDRP, and the decision is enforced by an ICANN-approved domain-
name registrar.
B. eBay
Founded in 1995, eBay is an online marketplace displaying
several tens of millions of items for sale at any given time, worldwide.
Sales take place between two eBay members; eBay itself only provides
the venue for trading. On any given day, several million transactions
are completed through eBay, mainly in the form of auctions, making it
one of the most vibrant successes of the Internet. Nevertheless,
through force of circumstances, a certain proportion of these
transactions started to give rise to disputes. This would happen in any
context in which transactions are concluded. But on the Internet, this
poses a particular challenge. On the one hand, the parties involved are
remote and anonymous traders who in principle engage only in one-
shot transactions; this makes control through word of mouth -
spreading the word about poor business practices - radically less
efficient, if at all possible.22 On the other hand, the average value of
transactions on online auction sites is low (typically below $10023),
while the costs of dispute resolution typically are higher than for
offline transactions of the same amount, for reasons related to
geographic distances, jurisdictional ambiguity, the need for translation,
and other similar factors. This had the effect of making the costs of
20 See UDRP, Para. 4(k).
21 In December 2007, The informal listing maintained by the World Intellectual
Property's Arbitration and Mediation Center contained 32 known cases where a
UDRP decision had been followed by a court procedure, out of over 12,000 cases
handled by the Center. See statistics available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/challenged/index.html and
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/cases.jsp. On the paucity of court
cases, see also Nicholas Smith & Erik Wilbers, The UDRP: Design Elements of an
Effective ADR Mechanism, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 215, 228 (2004).
22 See, e.g.. David P. Baron, Private Ordering on the Internet: The eBay Community
of Traders, 4 Bus. & POL. 245 (2002).
23 See, e.g., Calum MacDonald, Online Auction Sites Add Billions to Web Sales, THE
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access to justice prohibitive and leaving the parties with no practicable
options of dispute resolution. 24 A way of building trust in transactions
had to be found.
In the beginning, a loose social order emerged spontaneously,
with members establishing vague standards of conduct, commenting
on each other's behavior by email and on bulletin boards, and socially
excluding those members who were found to be repeatedly non-
compliant. Soon a group of six members called The Posse formed,
which attributed itself the task of policing the marketplace through
close monitoring and by authoritatively damaging the reputation of
those who violated the informal norms that had developed. 25 However,
as the eBay community grew, this loose ordering no longer seemed to
be sufficient. eBay had to find a more effective solution, one that
would be more predictable and thus more formalized. This was
achieved in several steps, by addressing precisely three aspects of the
problem. First, eBay proceeded to gradually introduce eBay user
policies, which grew increasingly dense, detailed and formalized.
Second, eBay introduced a reputation management system. Third, it
put in place a dispute resolution mechanism.
The eBay user policies, the norms of conduct formulated by
eBay, meanwhile have become a well-developed set of rules that
regulate a large variety of behavior on the marketplace. They are
updated regularly and completed on the basis of new commonly
26observed practices of eBay members. The emergence or change of
such practices is established either by a global observation of behavior
on the marketplace or by direct discussion with selected
representatives of the eBay "civil society" (its community of traders),
some of these representatives being nominated directly by the
community itself.27 In a process akin to the codification of custom, the
eBay user policies reproduce - or "positivize" in the sense of posited
norms - closely observed member habits, which themselves express
spontaneous social rules.
The reputation management system, introduced in 1996, operates
on a very simple basis. The first element of the system is the
establishment of a link between the online profile of an eBay member
and her real identity. This is achieved by a thorough identity check
(based on different factors, including certain credit card details) at the
stage of the creation of the online profile, combined with a clear
marking of those members who subsequently have changed their
member names. The second element is that, after the conclusion of
24 See, e.g.. GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER & THOMAS SCHULTZ, ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR CONTEMPORARY JUSTICE 70-72 (2004).
25 See, e.g.. Baron, supra note 22, at 246 247.
26 See, e.g., Grailf-Peter Calliess. Transnational Consumer Law: Co-Regulation of
B2C E-Commerce, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS (Olaf Dilling et al. eds., forthcoming
2007).
27 See, e.g.. Baron, supra note 22, at 9.
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each transaction, both parties are encouraged to leave feedback
regarding one another's contractual behavior. This feedback, which
can be positive, negative or neutral, permanently becomes part of the
assessed party's online profile and is displayed to every future
potential contractor. Negative feedback can, in principle, only be
removed by mutual agreement. This reputation management system
allows the creation of a history of transactions by integrating over time
the assessments of contracting partners, which is precisely how
commercial reputation usually works.
The dispute resolution mechanism, put in place in 1999, is a two-
tiered process of computer-assisted negotiation followed by mediation;
both stages of the process take place entirely over the Internet. They
constitute what is referred to as online dispute resolution. The concrete
management of the process is the task of a company, SquareTrade,
which provides online dispute resolution services in various contexts,
but primarily for eBay. In the first stage of the procedure, the two
parties negotiate using an interactive system accessible on the Internet.
This system suggests typical issues that the parties may have, and
thereby helps them identify and understand their issue, and then
recommends typical settlement agreements that statistically are likely
to be accepted in the situation described by the parties. It is based on a
simple form of artificial intelligence, constantly learning from prior
cases to guess what the parties' issues and agreeable solutions are
likely to be - IT jargon would call it an expert system. If the system
fails to achieve a voluntary resolution of the case, the parties may
request the intervention of a mediator, who then replaces the computer
in its attempt to bring the parties to an agreement, typically by better
articulating their issues and providing acceptable solutions.28
Negotiation, as the ADR movement has shown, does not take
place in a legal vacuum; there is always reference to a certain law, or
at least to a certain normative order, which the parties believe is
relevant in determining their rights and obligations. This is called the
effect of the shadow of the law.29 The law's shadow is reinforced
when a third party intervenes in the negotiation and reminds the
parties, implicitly or explicitly, of their rights and obligations,
provided the third party makes reference to the same law or normative
order as the parties. This third party can be either the mediator or, in
the system considered here, the computer - the parties' aggregated
understandings of their rights and obligations are reflected in the issues
and solutions suggested by the computer. An interesting question is
28 See, e.g, Steve Abernethy. Building Large-Scale Online Dispute Resolution and
Trustmark Systems, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: TECHNOLOGY AS THE "FOURTH
PARTY (Ethan Katsh & Daewon Choi eds., 2003), available at
http://www.webcitation.org/50 1HP5FHI.
29 See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser. Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979); Robert Cooter et al.,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); see also Pierre Bourdieu, Les rites comme actes
d'institution, 43 ACTES DE RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 59 (1982).
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then to know under the shadow of which law eBay dispute resolution
takes place, as it is not uncommon that the parties reside in different
countries. The answer seems to be even more interesting than the
question: an empirical study, conducted in 1999, found that it was
"eBay law.,,30 The norms that eBay members seemed to consider the
relevant rules of conduct, the norms whose normativity they seemed to
invoke, were the body of eBay user policies - "eBay law" - rather than
one or other of the national laws that would have been applicable in
court.
31
Reputation and dispute resolution are linked in several ways at
eBay. A party who refuses to participate in the dispute resolution
procedure or subsequently to comply with the outcome runs the risk of
being given reputation-damaging feedback by the other party. If this
negative feedback already has been given, then the dispute resolution
procedure offers three ways to remove it: (1) both parties reach a
settlement agreement through negotiation and mutually agree to
remove the feedback; (2) the case goes to mediation and the parties
reach a settlement and comply with its terms, in which case the
mediator will instruct eBay to remove the negative feedback; (3) the
party that left the negative feedback refuses to participate in the
dispute resolution process, in which case the mediator may again
instruct eBay to remove the negative feedback.
Another type of link between dispute resolution and reputation at
eBay is the icon that traders can display on their offerings. This icon,
generically called a trustmark, testifies to the fact that the trader
displaying it has pledged to submit to the dispute resolution process,
and in the past has shown to comply with this pledge, thereby adding
to the reputation of its holder. This has a significant economic
importance: when an eBay trader displays this trustmark, the number
of bids placed for each of his items typically will increase by fifteen
percent and the average selling price by twenty percent.32 If a
trustmark holder refuses to participate in the dispute resolution
procedure or refuses to comply with the outcome, she will be
sanctioned by the removal of the icon.
Now, it does not seem to be a mark of na*'vet6 to see the presence
of a certain normative order in the two contexts examined here.
However, the question that consequently must be answered, and which
too frequently is forgotten, is whether they are mere social orderings
(which would be a rather unexciting claim) or whether they can be
30 See Ethan Katsh et al., E-Commerce, E-Dispute, and E-Dispute Resolution: In the
Shadow of "eBay Law ", 15 OHIO ST. J. DiSP. RESOL. 705, 728 (2000).
31 See also Ethan Katsh, Adding Trust Systems to Transaction Systems: The Role of
Online Dispute Resolution, UNECE Forum on Online Dispute Resolution, at
http://www.ombuds.org/un/unecejune2002.doc (May 2002). at 4 (considering that
such a phenomenon is due to the fact that recourse to national courts is an unrealistic
option).
32 Figures provided by the CEO of the dispute resolution program in an interview
reported in KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 24, at 328.
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characterized as true legal systems. Before we move on to my
contention on this point, however, we still need to clarify certain
central questions. The first of them is the difference between social
orderings and legal systems, which is the topic of the following
section.
II. LEGAL SYSTEMS OR MERE SOCIAL ORDERINGS? THE CRITERION OF
SECONDARITY
Having thus identified two normative orders that seem
particularly autonomous from the public legal system, the question that
follows is whether these orders can be characterized as jural or not -
whether they constitute private legal orders or simply other forms of
normative orders.
Before the question is addressed, it may be worthwhile to
consider that law is a noetic unity; it is a concept not represented by
anything except our ideas about it. 33 Hence the definition of law
seems, even more than other definitions, to be chiefly, if not
exclusively, grounded in conventions among scholars. As a
conventional definition, what determines its quality (in other words
whether a specific definition should be retained or not) may be held to
be how it succeeds in the tests of fertility (what it is able to explain),
congruency (how many facets of the phenomenon it takes into
consideration), and rhetoric (whether it generally seems useful and
thus convincing to the scholars working with the concept).34 Brutally
simplifying, one may thus contend that what matters is to rely on a
workable definition of law, one that will yield concrete and
worthwhile results when applied in the study of a given subject and
that hopefully would strike one as sound and reasonable.
In addition, in the task of identifying a workable definition of
law for the analysis of private normative orderings on the Internet, one
may proceed from the premise that the Internet is a field of evolving
normativity. Hence it seems appropriate to refer to studies of
emerging normativity - theories that contain a temporal dimension in
their conceptualization of law and hence offer an explanation on how
and when emerging norms acquire a legal nature.
Finally, the approach chosen here is to focus on the structural
aspects of law as a legal system, instead of on certain specific
characteristics of norms considered in isolation, the latter of which
Norberto Bobbio considered to amount to "looking at the tree and not
the forest.
' 35
33 See, e.g., Paul Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 33 (1965).
34 See, e.g., Franqois Ost, Science du droit, in DICTIONNAIRE ENCYCLOPEDIQUE DE
SOCIOLOGIE ET DE THtORIE DU DROIT 540 (Andr&Jean Arnaud ed., 1993).
35 NORBERTO BOBBIO, TEORIA DELL'ORDINAMENTO GIURIDICO 7 (1960).
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The first part of an answer to this quest for a workable definition
that includes a temporal element may lie in the concept of
secondarity.36 This concept focuses on the distinction between a social
normative order and a legal order; it is based on the idea that
normative orders sometimes evolve and follow a series of identifiable
steps, from a relatively loose array of norms of conduct to a formalized
system of rules roughly akin to the public legal system. In the process,
as certain social norms become legal norms, the social normative
system is transformed into a legal order.37
As the name suggests, the concept of secondarity is about
secondary rules, as opposed to primary rules. The starting point of the
theory is Hart's tenet that an essential element of the distinction
between a legal system and other normative systems is the fact that a
legal system results from a combination of primary rules of conduct
and secondary rules that regulate the recognition, change and
adjudication of the primary rules. Other normative orderings
typically only have primary rules of conduct. In social orderings, for
instance, there are no rules that attribute to certain people or
institutions the powers to decide which are the existing social rules, to
change them, and to decide when they have been violated and what the
reaction should be. When that changes, the social ordering in question
may become a legal system. This takes place through secondarization
of the norms, as well as of the institutions and of the people, of the
normative system. To clarify how this evolution takes place, the
following starts by presenting the ideas of two of the scholars behind
the concept of secondarity: Norberto Bobbio and Paul Bohannan.
Among the prolific work of Norberto Bobbio is an article in
which he examined at length various relationships that may exist
between primary and secondary norms.39 One of his observations is
that the very semantics of the word secondarity suggest a
chronological order. Primary rules of conduct come first and they are,
in certain cases, later followed by the meta-level of secondary norms -
rules on other rules, that is adjectival law as opposed to substantive
law. The emergence of secondary rules, if it occurs, is not anodyne. It
testifies, not as a symptom but rather as an integral part of the
phenomenon, that a normative system evolves from what Bobbio calls
a "primitive or pre-jural ordering composed only of primary norms"
40
36 For an introduction, see FRAN(OIS OST & MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE, DE LA
PYRAMIDE AU RESEAU? 368-71 (2002).
37 On legal norms emerging from social norms, see JULIUS STONE, SOCIAL
DIMENSION OF LAW AND JUSTICE (1966); see also MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE &
FRANQOIS OST, LEGAL SYSTEM BETWEEN ORDER AND DISORDER 110 (lain Stewart
trans., 1994).
38 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 90 (2d ed. 1994).
39 See Norberto Bobbio, Ancora sulle norme primarie e norme secondarie, 59
RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA 35 (1968).
4 0 Id at 39.
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to become first a simple system, then a semi-complex one and finally a
complex normative system, of which the legal system is a typical
instance. These stages of evolution are defined as follows: A simple
system is one composed essentially of primary norms, but also
containing at least some sort of basic rule of recognition that identifies
the norm belonging together; without this element of cohesion, the
word "system" would indeed not be proper. Semi-complex systems
have, in addition, either rules of creation (or change) or of sanction (or
adjudication), but not both. Complex systems are those including all
these different types of norms, that is primary rules as well as the three
categories of secondary rules identified by Hart; it is a system where
rules regulating conduct are themselves regulated comprehensively by
other norms.
What drives this evolution from loose orderings of rules of
conduct to complex normative systems is the pursuit of what Bobbio
calls a state of dynamic equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is achieved
through secondary rules guaranteeing the conservation and
transformation of the primary rules. 41 Conservation means in this case
the avoidance of violations of primary rules at a rate that would
threaten the entire system with dissolution by inefficacy. Positively, it
means attaining a high level of efficacy through clear, predictable and
effective sanctions. Diffuse and spontaneous social blame is replaced
by an institutionalized and formally regulated system of responses to
violations of rules of conduct. Guaranteeing transformation of primary
rules means overcoming the relative stasis and eventual desuetude
inherent to slow customary adjustments operating by repeated practice
over long periods.42 Quicker and more flexible transformations of the
primary rules are made possible by the institutionalization of the
creation of norms, that is, by the introduction of a formal mechanism
for the elaboration and change of rules. This allows, on the one hand,
increased adaptation to social changes and, on the other hand,
deliberate impulses of social change by the pro-active introduction of
new primary rules. Again, the difference between a simple system of
rules, corresponding to a "primitive" society such as the one presumed
by the theory of the state of nature, and a complex normative system,
whose epitome is probably the modern state, is the introduction of
secondary rules - the transition from one layer to two layers of rules.
43
The introduction of secondary rules is accompanied by the
development of specific institutions. According to Bobbio, what
characterizes a simple normative system is the fact that specific
institutions for the conservation and transformation of the system are
missing. The subsequent development towards a more complex system
is dependent on the development of clearly identified judicial and
41 See id at 47 51.
42 See, e.g., HART, supra note 38, at 90; OST & VAN DE KERCHOVE, supra note 36, at
368.
43 See, e.g.. Bobbio, supra note 39, at 46; HART, supra note 38, at 89.
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legislative powers. 44 The judicial power, Bobbio maintains, typically
appears first. Judges have at that stage a double role: responding to
sanctions (conservation) and creating the rules they will apply
(transformation). In a second step, judges are joined by a parliament or
another specifically legislative institution. The emergence of
secondary rules goes hand in hand with the evolution of these formal
institutions: the rules attribute certain powers to specific institutions,
which in return give effect to these rules by responding formally to a
violation of a primary rule or by creating a new rule following a pre-
defined procedure. Secondary rules have no efficacy without formal
institutions, and formal institutions cannot exist without well-
developed secondary rules.
45
Further clarification on the concept of secondarity, and more
specifically on the role of institutions, can be found in the work of Paul
Bohannan. The author's main contribution to this theory is his notion
of "double institutionalization" or "reinstitutionalization." 46 To
understand what this notion means, one must first acknowledge the
coexistence within a single social field of social norms and legal
norms. The development of a legal system does not do away with the
social normative order underlying it.47 Metaphorically, one may view
the emergence of a legal system as taking place in a way similar to
biological cell reproduction: the social normative system creates
progressively a new normative system, which is built initially from the
same material but subsequently develops on its own. A legal system is
in this sense an offspring of a social normative system, progressively
detaching itself from its "parental" system. After this detachment, the
legal system becomes, as Frangois Ost and Michel van de Kerchove
put it, a "specialized system of engendering and sanction of legal
rules" that is "superposed and detached from the underlying social
system, to the point of giving the illusion of operating in isolation, in
autopoietic fashion, with strings no longer attached to the basic social
underpinnings."
48
This autopoiesis, however, is never attained completely. Eugen
Ehrlich, among many others, states that a legal system is never closed
entirely to its normative environment.49 And it is precisely on the
44 See, e.g.. Bobbio, supra note 39, at 51.
45 Cf SANTI ROMANO, LORDNAMENTO GIURIDICO (1917) (arguing that a legal
system is composed of, on the one hand, primary rules of conduct and, on the other
hand, institutions).
46 See Bohannan, supra note 33, at 34 37.
47 See, e.g.. GEORGES GURVITCH, ELEMENTS DE SOCIOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 185 186
(1949) (1942); VAN DE KERCHOVE & OST. supra note 37, at 110; Jacques Chevallier,
L 'ordrejuridique, in LE DROIT EN PROCES 7, 21 (Jacques Chevallier et al. eds., 1983).
48 OST & VAN DE KERCHOVE, supra note 36, at 369.
49 See, e.g., EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
(1913) (discussing his concept of "living law").
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interaction between the underlying social normative system and the
legal system that Bohannan's focus lies. He explains that this
interaction takes the form of a double institutionalization: norms are
first instituted informally in the social system and then, if they are to
become legal, reinstitutionalized in the legal institutions. The "salient
difference," Bohannan argues, between social and legal norms is that
"law is specifically recreated, by agents of society, in a narrower and
recognizable context - that is, in the context of the institutions that are
legal in character and, to some degree at least, discrete from all
others." 50 Social norms are reinstitutionalized or restated "in such a
way that they can be 'applied' by an institution designed (or, at least,
utilized) specifically for that purpose. 51 Primary (social) norms are
restated in accordance with secondary rules and thereby acquire their
jural character. The institutions now follow a "regularized way to
interfere.' ,52
The general picture these developments leave us with is the
following: the concept of secondarity pushes the view that the
progression from social to legal norms relies on a phenomenon of
duplication or secondarization of norms, people and institutions. Here
are these three components explained:
(1) Secondarity of norms: as soon as a group of people is
formed, norms will emerge - as the slightly but decisively amended
maxim goes: Ubi societas, ibi regula.53 At first, the norms will be
purely substantive as they regulate conduct. Then, in a second stage,
adjectival law or procedural rules will develop, which grant certain
people certain powers.
2) Secondarity of people: by being granted these powers, the
people concerned become agents of their group, and thus now have
two roles -they are members of the group and agents of the group.
3) Secondarity of institutions: informal institutions (such as
Councils of the elders) are replaced by formal institutions (such as
parliaments and courts), which are regulated by the procedural rules
and manned by the people to whom the special powers have been
given.
I have so far remained silent on a crucial question: if secondarity
explains the progression from merely social to legal, where should the
line be drawn? Or is there no such threshold, in the sense that the
concept of law is obtained by degree? Can it be that a normative order
may be more or less law and thus simply progressively becomes law,
and the actual transition from social to legal is nothing more than a
50 Bohannan, supra note 33, at 34.
51 Id. at 36.
52 Id. at 35.
53 I thereby oppose the idea of ubi societas ibi ius stricto sensu, that wherever there is
a society, there is ipso facto law, as defended for instance by Roberto Sacco, Mute
Law. 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 455 (1995); Giorgio del Vecchio, Sulla statualit del diritto,
9 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 1. 19 (1929); and LEOPOLD
POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 96 (1971).
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rather irrelevant diffuse gray zone? Here we need to put aside, for the
time being, the entire question of what a legal system is and if it may
be found on its own in cyberspace, to think for a minute about the
following question: is law a scalar or a dichotomous property? The
debate matters because a scalar notion of law permits a wishy-washy
approach to the question of what law is. It would indeed enable us to
assert quite easily that even the oddest hypotheses are instances of law:
the slightest resemblance with an obvious legal system would be a
sufficient reason to believe in the (very limited) juridicity of the
normative system under consideration. The importance of law would
thus almost completely vanish.
III. THE SCALABILITY IN LAW
Integrated over time, law has a strongly scalable dimension, in
the sense that an emerging field of normativity becomes a legal regime
incrementally. The evolution from a social normative system to a legal
system takes place progressively; there are many intermediate stages
between a typical social ordering and a full-blown legal system. Hence
it is at least theoretically possible to measure the extent of the
progression of a normative system from social ordering to a full-blown
legal system, or the degree of its proximity to a particularly vibrant
legal system. The question this raises is whether the property of being
law (or of being a legal system, which is one and the same question in
the approach chosen here) can itself be obtained to varying degrees,
that is whether it is scalar or not. Can a legal system be more jural than
another? The alternative is that what is obtained by degree is only the
clarity of the status of the legal system. As I will show below, legal
systems can differ in their degree of clarity, but once a system is a
legal system, it cannot be more or less a legal system than another
legal system.
As Dworkin noted, there are certain concepts to which
scalability attaches, and certain to which it does not. For example,
baldness comes by degrees: one can be bald to a greater or lesser
extent. Speed is another example: objects move more quickly or less
quickly. Other concepts are not matters of degrees. A house for
instance cannot be more a house than another. It cannot be a house to a
greater or lesser degree. A chair, also, is a chair or it is not, but one
chair cannot be twice as much a chair as another one. It can however,
as Wittgenstein observed, be more or less clearly a chair.55
Another seemingly germane point is that at least some
constituent elements of law are scalar, in the sense that they can be
satisfied to varying degrees. As Raz writes, "The general traits which
mark a system as a legal one are several and each of them admits, in
54 See Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law Observations Prompted by
Professor Fuller's Novel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 668, 677 (1965).
55 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS - APHORISMS
(1953).
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principle, of various degrees. 56 This seems true for a great variety of
conceptions of law, be these conceptions centered on elements such as
the presence of sanctions, unity, autonomy, the Fullerian principles of
legality 57 or the concept of secondarity. All of these cardinal elements
are scalar: sanctions can be more or less effective and thus present; a
normative system is marked by more or less unity or autonomy;58 the
Fullerian principles of legality are all gradual; 59 and the concept of
secondarity, as we have seen above, clearly functions by degrees.
Yet it is not because some of the constituent elements of a
concept are scalable that the concept itself is scalable. To hold the
contrary view would mean, to use Dworkin's words, that "whether
something is a novel, or a room, or an army is always a question of
degree, because size is one of the criteria of each. 60 One page of
fictional narrative is clearly not a novel, but rather a novella or a short
story. At fifty pages, it seems unclear whether we should grant it this
quality. At 200 pages, all doubt is quieted. But it would seem very
wrong to say that Great Expectations is a novel to a greater extent than
Hard Times. It would also be quite amusing to think of Alexander the
Great's army on the plains of Gaugamela to be an army to a lesser
extent than Darius's.
Another point is even though people can succeed in making law
to various degrees, or fail to do so entirely, law itself, once made, is
not scalar. The purposeful enterprise of doing X is not necessarily
equitable with X itself. I mean this as an objection to Fuller, who
claims that "[t]o speak of a legal system as an 'enterprise' implies that
it may be carried on with varying degrees of success. This would mean
that the existence of a legal system is a matter of degree., 61 He argues
that law is like education, in the sense that if you asked if education
56 RAZ, supra note 9, at 150.
57 These principles, termed in a negative way, are (1) "every issue [being] decided on
an ad hoc basis"; (2) -failure to publicize"; (3) "abuse of retroactive legislation"; (4)
'failure to make rules understandable"; (5) -enactment of contradictory rules"; (6)
enactment of rules that -require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party";
(7) "introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his
action by them"; and (8) "a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and
their actual administration." FULLER, supra note 10, at 122.
58 See, e.g., MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, GLOBAL LAW: A TRIPLE CHALLENGE 74
(2003)VAN DE KERCHOVE & OST, supra note 37, at 135-142.
59 "In no legal system is each of the [Fullerian] eight principles ever perfectly
fulfilled. Perfect compliance with each of them is a will-o'-the-wisp and is in any
event unnecessary for the existence of a legal regime. Although conformity with the
precepts of legality is essential for the existence of any such regime, the conformity
only needs to meet or exceed a threshold level; that threshold level for each of the
precepts is quite high. but if falls some way short of perfection. (Such a threshold
level, incidentally, cannot be specified precisely...)." KRAMER, OBJECTIVITY, supra
note 11, at 105.
60 Dworkin, supra note 54, at 678.
61 FULLER, supra note 10, at 122.
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existed in a given country, the answer would hardly be yes or no but
62rather a description of the achievements in this respect. So it would
be for law, Fuller contends, which necessarily would be appreciated as
a "performance falling between zero and a theoretical perfection., 63 In
my view, the addressee of the question about education necessarily
would speak of achievements because the obvious answer to the
question is "yes." It is so obviously "yes" that the question necessarily
would be reinterpreted as being directed to how good the education
system is, which is different entirely. The dichotomous question about
the presence of education can only fairly be asked, in its true meaning,
to a chimpanzee specialist, for instance, to enquire about the presence
of an educational system in ape communities. Under such
circumstances, the answer to the question may very well be "yes" or
"no," or some other reply expressing degrees of clarity. In this latter
situation, the question would be about X itself, whereas in the situation
envisaged by Fuller, the question is about the purposeful enterprise of
doingX.
Another distinction must be made in this context. If we contrast
the education system of the United States and a Saharan tribe, we may
well conclude that there is more education in the United States, but it
does not mean that it is more education. The American system of
education can be more thorough than the other one, but its educational
nature may be expected to be the same. Let me explain this with a
more intuitive example: the differences in musical achievement
between Britney Spears and Ludwig van Beethoven are quite clear to
most people, but we would be wrong to say that the 9th Symphony is
more music than Oops! I Did It Again. Shakespeare's opuses are not
more plays than Feydeau's. Marius Petipa's ballets are not more
ballets than Maurice Bjart's. If one can quite clearly be more or less
successful in the purposeful enterprise of doing anything, this does not
mean that the object of the enterprise is scalar itself. The purposeful
enterprise of creating law may be more or less successful, but this does
not mean that the result is more or less jural.
A purported scalar nature of law may not be derived from the
gradualness of the evolution of normative systems, either. Gradualness
of evolution does not necessarily entail scalability of the underlying
property. It is true that the developmental approach of law I have
adopted here posits, first, that a normative system evolves gradually
over time to become a legal system and, second, that once it is a legal
system, it continues to evolve to form "developed and ... less highly
developed legal systems," as Paul Bohannan would say. 64 Intuitively,
one might be tempted to think that the only approach consistent with
such a developmental view is one that acknowledges the scalability of
the underlying concept. However, in this case intuition may advise
62 Id. at 122-23.
63 Id. at 123.
64 Bohannan, supra note 33, at 37.
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wrongly, as I hope the following examples make clear. For instance,
the physical phenomenon of water becoming water vapor is gradual:
the thermal motion of water molecules increases, gradually, up to the
point where the kinetic energy overcomes the surface tension and
molecules evaporate. Regardless, this does not imply that the concepts
of water or water vapor are obtained by degrees. Even though the
transition from one state to the other has a scalable component (speed),
each of the two states are non-scalar. The evolution reaches a threshold
and then the difference in degree becomes a difference in kind. Over
the threshold, the continued evolution to a more or less highly
developed state does not, either, imply the scalar character of the
underlying concept. A muscle can be more or less developed, it can
achieve its functions to a higher or a lesser degree, but this does not
mean that we may speak in such cases of something that is more or
less of a muscle. As Matthew Kramer argues, over the threshold of
juridicity, a legal system may admit of various degrees not of
juridicity, but of "clarity," "straightforwardness," "robustness" or
"vibrancy," which determine how "full blown" it is.65
It seems possible to consider that there is such a thing as an
epitome of a legal system. This epitome of a legal system is meant to
represent what typically is understood as a legal system from a legal
pluralist's point of view, a legal system par excellence, a paradigmatic
example. A public legal system of a modern state, so long as it does
not have any particular flaw such as non-conformity to one or several
of Fuller's principles of legality, 66 would be an example of the epitome
of a legal system since few would deny its jural character.67 The
epitome is not, though, an ideal of perfection that is never attained in
68reality, such as a geometrical figure existing only in abstraction.
From a pluralist's point of view, the public legal system is a priori the
legal system that it most clearly a legal system; it is what would be
used as a paradigmatic example of what a legal system is; it would a
priori immediately be recognized as jural by the community of jurists.
Such a contention may be quite unexciting to those who are concerned
primarily with the comparison between different public legal systems,
either real or hypothetical, but it is of importance for an investigation
of the jural character of private legal systems, and how they compare
or contrast with the original model constituted by the ordinary public
legal system.
65 KRAMER, IN DEFENSE, supra note 12, at 97; KRAMER, OBJECTIVITY, supra note 11,
at 105, 107 109, 122.
66 See supra note 57.
67 The argument about the public legal system of the modern state being the epitome
of a legal system (though without reference to Fuller's principles of legality) is made,
for example. by ANDREI MARMOR, POSITIVE LAW & OBJECTIVE VALUES 39 42
(2001).
68 See, for example. Nigel E. Simmonds, Straightforwardly False: The Collapse of
Kramer's Legal Positivism. 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 98, 118-119 (2004); and the
comments thereupon in KRAMER, OBJECTIVITY, supra note 11. at 105-109.
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Nevertheless, to consider that an epitome of a given object exists
does not necessarily imply that the object itself is of a scalar nature.
Even if we can assess the difference between the epitome and the
examined instance of an object to varying degrees, even if we can
intellectually measure or at least assess the distance between any given
instance of a concept and its most typical instance, this does not mean
that the concept is scalar itself. An apple can be more or less like the
archetype of an apple (the paradigmatic example that we would
describe to someone who would not know what an apple is) but this
does not mean that an apple can be an apple to a greater or a lesser
extent. A woman and a man are not more or less of that nature
depending on their differences with respect to those represented on the
Pioneer plaque - the pictorial messages from mankind on board
unmanned spacecrafts Pioneer 10 and 11 representing what a woman
and a man typically look like. Even if a given person looks half man
and half woman, his or her appearance being halfway between a
typical man and a typical woman, the person would still be either one
or the other, however unclear it is to which one he or she belongs.
Hence, if a normative system is quite different in its aspect to an
ordinary public legal system, it does not follow that it is less jural, that
it is a legal system to a lesser degree. However, it may follow that it is
less clearly a legal system, or it may be the case that it is not a legal
system at all.
The preceding paragraphs are not meant to imply that a clear
threshold distinguishes social normative systems from legal systems.
On the contrary, it seems that it is not possible to position such a
threshold precisely. It seems that it is merely a "rough and shifting
69minimum" as Ronald Dworkin would say, or an "unspecifiable
threshold" as Matthew Kramer puts it. 7° The boundaries ofjuridicity,
these authors contend in essence, are unspecifiable, and I would tend
to agree. Where I seem not to be able to agree with Dworkin is when
he considers that, within this zone of unspecifiability, juridicity is
scalar, while outside it, it is not.7 1 Indeed, it seems odd to consider that
law is, at certain stages of its development, a scalar property and, at
other stages, a non-scalar property. The degree of development of a
concept's instantiation does not change the nature of the concept.
Although we may not specify this threshold, what we may do is
measure or at least assess how near or far a given normative system is
from the epitome of a legal system: an ordinary public legal system of
the modern state. The nearer it is, the more clearly it will be law or, at
69 Dworkin, supra note 54, at 678.
70 "Above an unspecifiable threshold of conformity with Fuller's principles of
legality, any system of governance amounts to a legal system. To be sure, there can
exist borderline cases of territories in which the rule of law is neither determinately
present nor determinately absent, and there can also exist territories in which the rule
of law is present in some respects and absent in other respects." KRAMER,
OBJECTIVITY, supra note 11, at 107.
71 Dworkin, supra note 54, at 678.
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the least, the more likely it will be that it has passed the threshold of
juridicity. I do not mean that a certain similarity to the public legal
system is a necessary condition, but rather I see it as a sufficient
condition for a normative system to be law, or at least likely to be law.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL POWERS
In the preceding section, we have seen that law may best be
considered a dichotomous property that is obtained in varying degrees
of clarity. What remains to be expounded upon is what properly can be
called a legal system. In other words, where should the line should be
drawn between legal systems and mere social normative systems? The
following sets forth what I hope to be a workable test that, if satisfied,
constitutes a sufficient - though not necessary - condition to be law.7
The test relies on jurisdiction powers: if a given normative system has
its own autonomous jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce,
then it constitutes a legal system in its own right. The following
explains why, and then applies the test to the two normative systems
on the Internet identified in the foregoing.
A. Prescription, Adjudication and Enforcement. Three
Complementary Rules of Recognition
We have seen, through the prism of the concept of secondarity,
that for a norm to be a legal norm, to be transformed from a social
norm into a legal norm, it needs to be restated (or "reinstitutionalized")
in the formal institutions of the legal system, by the officials or agents
of the legal system. This means, in the words of Paul Bohannan, that
the norms must be "restated in such a way that they can be 'applied'
by an institution designed (or, at least, utilized) specifically for that
purpose. 73
Using terminology that might be more telling, the restatement of
a norm means the passage of the test set by a secondary rule of
recognition. Restatement amounts to recognition - note that we
sometimes speak of the "adoption" of a rule. A social norm becomes
legal if it is endorsed (restated, reinstitutionalized, recognized) by an
institution of the legal system and such endorsement occurs according
to the applicable rule of recognition. To apply a rule of recognition is
to verify if a norm that does not yet belong to the system should be
taken over into the system by operation of its restatement in
institutions "designed specifically for that purpose."
These institutions may not, and frequently do not, act in perfect
harmony. Dissension normally exists between different officials of a
72 To determine juridicity on such a basis might thus produce false negatives, but it
should admit of only very few false positives, which is what matters for the present
study.
73 Bohannan, supra note 33, at 36.
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single legal system. When such dissension concerns the production of
law, this means that the law-ascertaining behavior of different officials
may not make reference to exactly the same rules.74 When we use
Hart's phrase "the Rule of Recognition," we actually speak of rules of
recognition, in the plural, of an "overarching array" of rules. 75 They
are plural not only in the sense that one rule cannot govern all facets of
the validation of a norm as law, but also in the sense that different
76legal authorities apply different rules of recognition. What is
declared to be law - to be legally valid - by the legislative branch is
for instance not necessarily recognized by the judiciary. In other
words, the institutions of a legal system do not restate norms at exactly
the same conditions. In contrast to Hart's view that there is only one
rule of recognition, Raz suggests that "there are various rules of
recognition ... each addressed to a different kind of officials., 77 The
degree of variance among these rules of recognition is limited, but
such variance nonetheless typically exists.
78
One consequence of such a plurality of rules of recognition is
that a given norm may be restated, and thus attributed juridicity, by a
higher or lower number of institutions or officials within a single
system.79 The juridicity of a norm typically is clearer if it is recognized
by a higher number of officials. If all the conditions of all officials are
met, the norm in question most clearly will be law, as the integration
of the norm into the system will have taken place to the greatest extent.
There are different levels of completeness in the reinstitutionalization
(or the restatement or recognition).
This reinstitutionalization takes place at three main stages: the
formulation of the norm, its application, and its enforcement. The
reinstitutionalization of a norm is most complete (and consequently the
norm in question is jural to the highest degree of clarity allowed by the
system) when the norm passes the tests set by the three slightly
differing rules of recognition corresponding to these different stages. A
norm that passes these three tests is most clearly law. The realization
74 See, e.g., Matthew H. Kramer, Of Final Things: Morality as One of The Ultimate
Determinants of Legal Validity, 24 L. & PHIL. 47, 50 (2005).
7 5 See, e.g., id at 49, 51.
76 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 200 (2d ed. 1980).
77 id.
78 Matthew Kramer made a very clear point in his observation that a "bewilderingly
higgledy-piggledy array of contrary signals and interventions" fundamental and
highly recurrent contradictions between jural officials - would simply not be law.
KRAMER, IN DEFENSE, supra note 12, at 142 146. Fundamental and repeated
contradictions among officials would indeed defeat the "principle of unity binding
different elements together so as to make them into a system." VAN DE KERCHOVE &
OST, supra note 37, at 135.
79 See e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 621, 634-637 (1986) (arguing that amendments to the U.S. Constitution are
subject to multiple rules of recognition).
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of those three conditions is not a necessary condition, but a sufficient
condition. Here is what I mean. First, a norm needs to be formulated; it
may be enacted or reinstitutionalized by dint of the praetorian power
of the judiciary, through case-law. As an example, the prohibition of
smoking develops as a social rule, and different facets of it have been
reinstitutionalized in the legal system by enactment of anti-smoking
laws. Second, the norm then needs to be applied in the adjudication of
concrete cases, otherwise it will have the character of a paper rule.
Admittedly, when the norm is formulated by the judiciary itself, it may
be difficult to distinguish these two stages of reinstitutionalization in
practice, but they can nonetheless be distinguished analytically. In my
example of smoking, this means that the anti-smoking laws effectively
are applied in court. Finally, the norm needs to be enforced in practice,
otherwise it will again have the character of a paper rule, but less so
than if it is not even applied in court. In my example of smoking, this
means, for instance, that the police intervene to actually prohibit
smoking.
These three main stages of reinstitutionalization, one may add,
constitute what John Locke saw as the three principal reasons for a
community to leave the state of nature and form what came to be
called, more than a century after Locke, a Rechtsstaat (a government
subject to the rule of law). Locke writes that, in the state of nature,
"[t]here wants an established, settled, known law, received and
allowed ... a known and indifferent judge ... [and] power to back and
support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution."80
In order to make possible the occurrence of these acts of
reinstitutionalization (and to achieve the Lockean goals of a
community leaving the state of nature), the normative system needs
institutions that have these powers of formulation, application and
enforcement. These institutions make possible the
reinstitutionalization of norms, which means - to use an extreme
image - to tear the legal system away from the underlying social
system in order to achieve the duplication of the normative system that
lies at the heart of the concept of secondarity. This is also to say that
the legal system, by virtue of these institutions, acquires a level of
autonomy from the underpinning social system. Considered no longer
from a vertical angle (in which the legal system hovers over the social
system, so to speak) but from a horizontal one, the institutions
mentioned here also are necessary to implement the system's own
rules of recognition so as to be autonomous from other legal systems.
This criterion of autonomy from other legal systems is expressed
by Franqois Ost and Michel van de Kerchove when they write that "the
minimal condition on which a legal system possesses an identity in
relation to another is that it is composed not only of rules of behavior,
but also of a rule of recognition peculiar to it and making it possible
for it to identify those rules as its own." 81 Yet it is not hard to see why
80 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 124 126 (1690).
81 VAN DE KERCHOVE & OST, supra note 37, at 141 (emphasis added).
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it is not sufficient for a legal system to be equipped simply with
secondary rules of recognition. In addition, these rules of recognition
must be efficacious, so that the legal system may effectively decide
upon its borders. It must effectively be able, in the words of Hans
Kelsen, to "regulat[e] its own creation and application, ' '82 to reach
what others have called the "faculty of self-organization,' , 83 without
which one may not speak properly of a system of norms of its own.
84
The operations of the rules of recognition can only be efficacious -
there can only be self-organization or autonomy - if the legal system
in question has its own institution to implement them. 85
In other words, for the tests of recognition implied by the acts of
formulation, application and enforcement to take place, the normative
system needs institutions that have these powers of formulation,
application and enforcement.
If a normative system possesses the institutions in question here,
which provide for system-specific formulation, application and
enforcement of norms, then it means that the system has prescriptive,
adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction. I mean jurisdiction here in
the sense of a power,86 rather than a right or an authority as is
commonly used87 in international law when states are granted these
rights. 88 Jurisdiction is here an issue of efficacy: the normative system
shows its capacity to formulate, apply and enforce its norms.
Now reverse the argument. If one can establish that a given
normative system has prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement
jurisdiction, that it has institutions that adopt rules, apply those rules in
their own dispute resolution mechanisms and enforce them, then this
testifies to the fact that the system has institutions that allow it to be
autonomous from other systems. It shows that the system has the
82 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 71 (1967). It may be recalled that this is an
essential characteristic of law in Kelsen's approach.
83 2 CHARLES ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 204, at 407 (1974).
84 See, e.g., VAN DE KERCHOVE & OST, supra note 37, at 139-42.
85 On a side note, one may point out that the famous quote by Oliver Wendell
Holmes is essentially a question relating to the efficacy of rules of recognition. When
he writes that "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law," it may be understood to mean that the only
rule of recognition that is really efficacious is the rule used by the courts. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Lav, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897).
86 Robert Wolff defines power as "the ability to compel compliance, either through
the use or the threat of force." ROBERT WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 4 (1970).
The term "force" must here be taken in a very broad sense, over and above mere
physical force and encompassing all means of coercion; this will be clarified later on.
87 Authority being understood here as "the right to command, and correlatively, the
right to be obeyed." Id.
88 See, e.g.. Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law. 46 BRIT. YB INT'L
L. 145 (1974).
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ability to effectively reinstitutionalize norms to the greatest clarity of
juridicity. Such a system would thus be able to produce law with a
high level of clarity regarding its juridicity and be itself a legal system
in a very clear fashion.
When I point to enforcement by a system's own institutions, I
mean it in the sense that the norms do not, in order to obtain a
reasonable degree of compliance, need to resort to the state's coercive
system or to any external apparatus of enforcement. "External" implies
here that the apparatus lends its coercive arm on conditions that are not
determined by the private normative system. An example would be the
enforcement procedure of the public legal system for an arbitral award.
The award, in order to gain access to coercive might, must meet the
requirements set by the public legal system. This condition of
enforcement power is particularly important, on the one hand because
of the central role of coercive might in the concept of law - as authors
as diverse as Immanuel Kant, John Austin, Rudolf von Jhering, Max
Weber, Hans Kelsen and John Rawls have maintained - and, on the
other hand, because it is precisely what is lacking in most
contemporary allegations of the existence of non-state legal systems.
In the following, I will set out to demonstrate that the normative
systems of the Internet that I investigate here (domain names and
eBay) have these three dimensions of jurisdiction. The demonstration
essentially will consist of showing that these two normative fields
produce their own norms, apply them in their own fora and enforce
them using their own mechanisms.
B. Prescriptive Jurisdiction
With regard to ICANN's normative system concerning domain
names, its prescriptive jurisdictional power manifests itself in the fact
that, in ICANN proceedings, the procedural and substantive applicable
law (to speak in terms of conflict of laws) is the UDRP, which has
been promulgated by ICANN itself. The UDRP determines both how
the procedure is conducted and how the merits of the case are
assessed.
Admittedly, the UJDRP provides that decisions on the merits of a
case shall be in accordance with the UDRP as well as "any rules and
principles of law that it deems applicable."8 9 In spite of this, empirical
studies suggest that the dominant normative source is, by far, the
UDRP itself.90 The provisions setting the conditions on which a
domain name will be transferred or cancelled are essentially ICANN's
own provisions, with only limited and inconsistent reference made to
national laws as extra-systemic sources of interpretation for the UDRP.
The UDRP fundamentally applies instead of national trademark laws
on the matter.
89 UDRP RULES, Para. 15(a).
90 See, e.g.. Thomas H. Webster, Domain Name Proceedings and International
Dispute Resolution, 2001 Bus. L. INT'L 215, 236.
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The mere promulgation of the UDRP by ICANN was already
considered, at the time it took place, to be ICANN's "most glaring
example of ... policymaking." 91 Since then, the effects of the UDRP
have grown by dint of a progressively stronger doctrine of de facto
stare decisis - the practice of referring to and following prior decisions
even if no express rule requires this to be done.92 Such a practice
excludes national law even further, as the sources of interpretation
tend to become more intra-systemic, they evolve towards confining
themselves progressively to prior decisions rendered in application of
the UDRP by dispute resolution panels operating under the aegis of
ICANN-approved institutions. The normative system also becomes
normatively denser, and thus consolidates itself, as precedents become
more numerous.
Already in 2002, an empirical analysis showed that UDRP case
law was characterized by a clear substantive separateness from
national trademark laws, granting trademark owners substantially more
protection than national laws do.93  In order to reduce certain
inconsistencies among decisions rendered under the UDRP, some
commentators have proposed the use of databases and search engines
in order to improve access to prior decisions; 94 this simplified access
to precedents would increase the separation between the UJDRP and
national case law, if only because the need to refer to public legal
systems would be greatly reduced.
One may either praise such an evolution, because of its increased
predictability, or criticize it, for its decreasing democratic legitimacy
as it is moving away from state law, but this is not the purpose of my
contention here. I only mean to push for the idea that this normative
system is moving, from the point of view of its normative sources,
towards increased closure vis-Ai-vis other legal systems, and it is thus
acquiring increasing autonomous prescriptive jurisdictional power.
From this point of view, ICANN's normative system seems to be
moving towards greater clarity of being a legal system.
eBay's prescriptive jurisdictional power manifests itself in its
formulation of the eBay user policies. These policies are adopted
formally by eBay on the basis of the emerging practices it observes
91 A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around
the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 96 (2000).
92 On the concept of de facto stare decisis, see Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare
Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 845, 937 (1999).
93 See, e.g., ALEXANDRE CRUQUENAIRE, LE REGLEMENT EXTRAJUDICIATRE DES
LITIGES RELATIFS AUX NOMS DE DOMAINE (2002); MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE
ROOT 231 (2002); Keith Blackman. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy: A Cheaper Way to Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics, 15 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 211. 233-236 (2001).
94 See, e.g.. Ethan Katsh. Online Dispute Resolution: Some Implications for the
Emergence of Law in Cyberspace. 10 LEX ELECTRONICA, at 10 (Winter 2006), at
http://www.webcitation.org/50 lHaxjcg.
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within the eBay community. The same policies, with some minor
alterations, are applicable throughout eBay's entire marketplace, in all
countries from which it is accessible. They are, in other words,
transnationally applicable. Conversely, the substance of the provisions
that would be applicable if an eBay dispute was brought to court -
among which are mandatory consumer protection laws that cannot
legally be contracted out of- varies from one national law to another.
An almost inevitable consequence thereof is that, in some cases, the
same dispute will receive different treatment when resolved in a forum
referring only to eBay policies and in a court applying mandatory
provisions of a national law.95 This is not meant to imply that eBay is
cut off completely from the public legal system. Evidence to the
contrary is for instance adduced by the fact that eBay proscribes from
its listings items that have been banned by certain governments or that
violate intellectual property laws in certain countries.
Hence, both ICANN and eBay's normative systems appear to be
equipped with institutions that possess autonomous powers of rule
formulation, that is institutions that permit the formulation of rules
specifically for these systems. In other words, they seem to have their
own jurisdictions to prescribe, which is the first element that
characterizes them as legal systems. The next section examines the
second such element, namely the presence of institutions able to apply
these rules autonomously for these systems. This is the question about
adjudicative jurisdiction.
C. Adjudicative Jurisdiction
The power of adjudicative jurisdiction of ICANN's normative
system resides in the four dispute resolution institutions that ICANN
has accredited, which apply the UDRP. As has been said above, a
trademark owner who wishes to challenge a domain name may start
UDRP proceedings by filing a complaint with one of these institutions.
The institution to which the complaint has been referred then appoints
a dispute resolution panel, which resolves the dispute by handing
down a decision applying the UDRP. The respondent (the domain-
name holder) cannot refuse the jurisdiction of the selected institution.
This is so because of a contractual structure that forces any party
wishing to register a domain name falling under the competence of
96ICANN to subscribe to a certain dispute resolution agreement.
ICANN includes, in all contracts with registrars by which it grants
them access to its database resolving domain names into IP addresses,
a clause stipulating that contracts between those registrars and
registrants (people wishing to register domain names) must contain a
given third-party beneficiary clause. The registrars are forced to enter
into this accreditation contract with ICANN if they want to be
technically able to register names. The third-party clause obliges the
95 See Calliess, supra note 26 (examining such differences between German law and
the eBay policies).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 15 and 16.
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domain-name holder to submit to the UDRP procedure if any person,
anywhere, initiates such a procedure alleging that his trademark is
infringed by the domain name. By agreeing to this clause, the domain-
name holder grants the registrar with whom she has registered her
domain name the right to transfer or cancel the name in accordance
with the decision of the dispute resolution panel. This contractual
construction has the effect of making it impossible to hold a domain
name falling under the competence of ICANN without submitting to
the jurisdiction of dispute resolution institutions that are themselves
submitted to ICANN.97
Admittedly, the UDRP does not legally qualify as arbitration.
Whereas arbitral proceedings produce awards that have a binding
character similar to that of a court decision and are recognized and
enforced by courts with only very limited possibilities of opposition,
UDRP decisions are not given any weight, or at least any binding
character, by courts.98 It would not be an over-simplification to say
that, for the purposes of court proceedings, a UDRP procedure has
simply no relevant juridical existence. Still, it would be wrong to
consider for that reason that the four ICANN-approved institutions
applying the UDRP cannot represent the system's adjudicative
jurisdiction. If it had been possible to appeal UDRP decisions in
national courts so that they review the way the UDRP is interpreted,
one may have argued that the rule of recognition of ICANN's
normative system were submitted to the rule of recognition of the
relevant public legal system and that it were not autonomous.
However, the reality is that courts never tell UDRP panels how the
UDRP should be interpreted. The public trademark regime and the
private ICANN system simply run in parallel, each of them applying
their own set of primary rules.
In the case of a conflict between a UDRP decision and a court
decision on the same matter, the latter has precedence. This is so
simply because ICANN, as a corporation, is compelled by the public
legal system to comply with the relevant court decision. Here again,
this should not be a basis to deny ICANN's adjudicative power, be it
only for the reason that such conflicts occur only in situations that
statistically are exceptional (less than one percent of cases). 99 In any
event, it is not the determination of the substance of ICANN's
normative system that is submitted to the public legal system. The
question here is only a matter of the general efficacy of the system. In
the case of a conflict with the public legal system (which, again,
occurs almost never), ICANN's system simply is not efficacious.
However, this is unrelated to the determination of what ICANN's
system effectively recognizes to be its normative contents at the stage
97 See, e.g.. MUELLER, supra note 93, at 13; Froomkin supra note 91, at 49, 97.
98 See, e.g., KAUFMANN-KOHLER & SCHULTZ, supra note 24, at 38-39, with further
references.
99 The precise figure seems to be somewhere between 0.5 and 1 percent: see
Thornburg, supra note 21, at 224.
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of adjudication. ICANN's rule of recognition applied by its
adjudicative bodies remains intact. ICANN's normative system still
regulates its own creation and application, even if the end result is not
enforced on the odd occasion.
eBay's jurisdictional power is constituted by its online dispute
resolution mechanism, which I have discussed above. It may be
recalled that the parties' submission to this mechanism is ensured by
the threat of damage to their reputation. If a party refuses to
participate, he is likely to be given negative feedback, which will
attach to his profile, or, if the negative feedback has already been
given, he will lose his best chance to have it removed. In addition, if
the party in question displays the dispute resolution icon, which
increases her competitiveness as a seller, her refusal to participate in
the dispute resolution procedure will lead to the removal of the
trustmark. This will harm her reputation, as the trustmark testifies to
the fact that the seller previously has agreed to participate in all dispute
resolution procedures initiated against her, which is itself a form of
reputation.
Admittedly, this jurisdictional power is not very highly
developed, since the dispute resolution process consists of mediation
and computer-assisted negotiation. These processes are not, strictly
speaking, adjudicative. A third party does not resolve the dispute by
authoritatively applying rules in the process of rendering a final and
binding disposition. Still, this does not mean that this dispute
resolution procedure is not the place where eBay's rules come to be
applied. The application of rules need not take place in an authoritative
way in order to be effective; rules need not be thrust upon their
addressees in order to take effect. Law's normativity may also simply
follow from what Marc Galanter calls information transfer, 100 which in
essence is the communication of the substance of primary rules,
accompanied by repeated reminders thereof. Such a creation of legal
awareness, if met with a certain degree of orientation according to
those rules on the part of the addressees, amounts to a form of
application of law. This is precisely what the phenomenon of
negotiating in the shadow of the law is about. It is "regulation
accomplished by the flow of information rather than directly by
authoritative decision." 10 1 Moreover, we have seen that the law whose
shadow the parties seem to negotiate is the body of eBay's own user
policies, which emerge from the eBay community and have been
reinstitutionalized, to use Paul Bohannan's vocabulary, by eBay itself.
In addition, one may surmise that eBay's dispute resolution
system will evolve to become a properly adjudicative mechanism. Two
elements allow such a conjecture. The first consists of certain
unofficial statements to this effect by staff members, accompanied by
an en passant reference to arbitration on the website of SquareTrade,
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the company that provides eBay's dispute resolution services. 10
2
Second, we have witnessed an evolution on eBay from a loose and
spontaneous practice of norm enforcement by The Posse (the group of
six people who attributed themselves the function of policing the
marketplace) to a relatively sophisticated and formalized system of
dispute resolution. Legal anthropology suggests that, after such an
evolution, the development of a properly adjudicative means of dispute
resolution may be an expected next step. 03
In sum, both ICANN and eBay's normative systems appear to be
equipped with institutions able to apply, directly or indirectly, the
systems' norms in an autonomous manner. Hence, they seem to have
their own jurisdictions to adjudicate, which is the second element that
qualifies them as legal systems. The next section examines the third
such element, namely the presence of institutions able to enforce these
rules independently from any other legal system.
D. Enforcement Jurisdiction
Enforcement jurisdiction, in the sense of a normative system
having the power to enforce its norms itself, is what is lacking in most
orderings that usually are asserted to be legal systems, such as the lex
mercatoria. My assertion is that the two legal systems explored in this
Article have this missing element, which thus makes them legal
systems to a particularly high degree of clarity in comparison to most
other private legal systems. This enforcement jurisdiction flows from
the fact that these systems do not need to resort to the coercive
apparatus of the state, unlike the lex mercatoria. They are equipped
with what may be called self-enforcement mechanisms.
The main role of the coercive apparatus of the state is to create
prudential reasons to obey the law. Prudential reasons for action are
opposed to moral reasons for action, in that the former, and not the
latter, are interest dependent. 104 People act in a certain way for
prudential reasons if they believe that it is in their interest to do so, that
they would be better off, for reasons that do not include having a good
or bad conscience, which is precisely a moral question. People act in a
certain way for moral reasons if they believe it is morally correct to act
in such a way. To achieve compliance based on prudential reasons - as
opposed to compliance because of the moral adequacy of the norms -
a normative system must in principle create interest-dependent reasons
to be obeyed. Such reasons typically are created by the threat of a
102 SquareTrade's Seal Member Agreement. Para. 2(1), available at
http://www.webcitation.org/50]HeahL3, provides that "Dispute resolution services
provided by SquareTrade consist of direct negotiation, mediation and arbitration."
103 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 15 (1983); Lawrence M.
Friedmann, Courts Over Time: A Survey of Theories and Research, in EMPIRICAL
THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 9, 15-16 (Keith 0. Boyum and Lynn Mather eds., 1983).
104 See, e.g.. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE, supra note 12, at 81 83; RAZ, supra note 9. at
155 156.
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sanction, a sanction being understood as the deprivation of some of the
normal advantages of a member of the group on the ground that he has
violated a norm.l°5 In the case of the public legal system, sanctions are
made possible primarily by the coercive apparatus of the state.
The sanction of last resort of the coercive apparatus of the state,
which consequently corresponds to the most fundamental reason to
obey the law, is the use of coercive might, in the sense of physical
force, as in forcefully taking away assets or imprisonment. This led to
the belief that physical force is an essential element of law, and thus
produced the classical legal positivists' monistic construction of law
(law as the exclusive product of the modern state' 6), because the
control of physical force ultimately rests in the hands of the state.
10 7
However, the threat of physical force is not the only interest-
dependent reason for compliance that a normative system may create
or the only vector of sanctions that norms may rely on.1°8 A normative
system may rely on any "pattern of incentives that will secure [its]
efficacious functioning." 10 9 Such incentives essentially operate by
"altering the prices one has to pay for the performance of actions,
[which] supplies a motive for avoiding some actions and doing
others." 110 These prices may be of very different nature: they may be
of a nature that can be controlled by physical force (liberty,
possession), but they may also be of a nature that can be controlled by
social forces (reputation) or market forces (financial gains and losses).
To use a different vocabulary, law can resort to different modalities of
constraint. 111
Law may not only intervene with its coercive sway to
supplement a community's failing reputation or a market's failing
economic sanctions, 112 it may also create and use social or economic
constraints. When is this possible? Matthew Kramer explains that
imperatives are "products of the overwhelming superiority ... of the
105 See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PH. R. 5, 10 (1955) ("[Being]
deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen on the ground he has violated a
rule of law.").
106 See, e.g., NORBERTO BOBBIO, IL POSITIVISMO G1URIDICO: LEZIONI Di FILOSOFIA
DEL DIRITTO (1961).
107 See, e.g., BOBBIO, supra note 35, at 186; FULLER, supra note 10, at 109-110;
KELSEN, supra note 82, at 333; Frangois Rigaux, Les situations juridiques
individuelles dans un syst~me de relativit gjn~rale, 213 RECUEIL DES COURS DE
L'ACADMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1. 31 (1989).
108 See, e.g., RAz, supra note 9. at 157.
109 KRAMER, IN DEFENSE, supra note 12, at 91.
110 Rawls, supra note 105, at 107.
111 See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662.
(1998).
112 See, e.g., MARMOR. supra note 67, at 44-45.
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addressors over the addressees."' 113 To create such a situation of
overwhelming superiority, a normative system (as the addressor) needs
to control certain resources that interest its addressees.1 14 These
resources can be, again, liberty or possession, but they can also be
reputation or financial advantages, which may be easily controlled by
non-state actors. 1 5 In sum, another apparatus, which may be
controlled privately, can create prudential reasons to obey a private
legal system, thereby playing the same role that the coercive apparatus,
through its physical force, plays for the public legal system. This is the
first part of what the concept of self-enforcement stands for: a private
mechanism that creates, by the threat of a sanction relying on the
private control of valuable resources, prudential reasons to comply
with the norms of the system to which the self-enforcement
mechanism belongs. It is self-enforcement in the sense that the private
legal system does not have to rely on the coercive apparatus of the
state to secure the enforcement of its norms.
As I have suggested above, prudential reasons typically are
created by the threat of a sanction. However, law may also create
prudential reasons in another way: by virtue of a modification of the
feasibility of certain actions. The feasibility of an action creates
prudential reasons for action, or more precisely reasons for abstaining
from acting, in the sense that if an action is impossible or very difficult
to execute then typically a person has a strong prudential reason to
refrain from expending time on efforts to perform it. The feasibility of
an action can be influenced, if not determined, by law. Examples
would be locked doors that enforce a prohibition from entering into
given rooms or narrow bollards enforcing width restriction to prevent
lorries from passing through residential areas. In the context of the
Internet, the contention has a particular importance. There, technology
plays the role of the laws of nature, making possible or impossible
certain actions, or more generally making them difficult (and thus less
frequent) or easy (and thus more frequent).1 16 The control of
technology, which is available to rule makers and is not used
infrequently, allows compliance to be obtained. This is the second part
of what self-enforcement stands for: the implementation of norms by
direct manipulation of the environment in which certain actions take
place, again without recourse to the state's coercive apparatus.
ICANN's legal system for domain names uses technology to
enforce its norms. Its control of certain technological aspects
113 KRAMER, IN DEFENSE, supra note 12, at 85.
114 On the concept of "resource control" as the basis of constraint, see, for example,
THOMAS SCHULTZ, REGULER LE COMMERCE ELECTRONIQUE PAR LA RESOLUTION DES
LITIGES EN LIGNE 327 330 (2005).
115 The resources can also be of another nature, for instance the announcement of a
future divine punishment in a theocratic society, as Fuller sketches in FULLER, supra
note 10. at 109 110.
116 See, e.g., Lessig. supra note 14, at 9 28, 120 37.
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constitutes its jurisdictional power relating to enforcement. It uses
technology to enforce norms that do not a have a simple structure of
permission/prohibition, but relate to the distribution of resources,
namely domain names. As has been mentioned above, a decision
rendered under the UJDRP, by one of ICANN's accredited dispute
resolution institutions, is self-enforced by changing an entry in the
database that makes domain names visible on the Internet. This has the
result of re-attributing to the prevailing party the resource that the
domain name represents. Such a self-enforcement mechanism is made
possible by ICANN's control over this database and thus over the
visibility of domain names, which is the resource that interests the
parties.
In principle, the enforcement by this mechanism can be warded
off easily, by initiating proceedings in certain courts, within ten days
of the UDRP decision. 117 In other words, the domain name holder can
decide to opt out of ICANN's legal system -which, it may be recalled,
she had been forced to enter to be able to register her domain name. If
she decides to do so, ICANN's legal system will give way, it will
relinquish its capacity to enforce the decision (transfer or cancel the
domain name). 118 However, as we have seen in the previous section,
this almost never occurs in practice. This appears to be for two main
reasons. First, there are the costs of court proceedings, which often
will be in disproportion to the value of the domain name, especially
because of the likelihood that the dispute will have an international
character, which generates additional costs. These costs act as an
economic barrier to access the public legal system. Second, the brevity
of the time-limit within which the court proceedings must be initiated
- ten days - also makes it practically difficult to trigger the
intervention of the public legal system.1 19 The end result is that
ICANN's legal system is equipped with its own enforcement
mechanism, which effectively intervenes in 99 percent of cases.
ICANN virtually always carries out its own enforcement of its norms.
eBay's enforcement power lies in its control of the reputation of
its members. If an eBay member refuses to comply with the outcome
of eBay's dispute resolution procedure, he will do so at the price of his
reputation. He will either be given negative feedback or, if it has
already been given, it will not be removed. In addition, he will run the
117 UDRP Para. 4(k). These courts are in principle either the court of the registrar of
the domain name or of the domain-name holder.
118 Id, which provides, infine:
"[W]e will not implement the Administrative Panel's decision, and we will take
no further action, until we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution
between the parties; (ii) evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been
dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing
your lawsuit or ordering that you do not have the right to continue to use your
domain name."
119 See Blackman, supra note 89, at 236; Brenda Sandburg, ICANN Needs Fine
Tuning: Laiiyers Mull Pros and Cons of Adding an Appeals Process. NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 6. 2000, at B10; Thornburg. supra note 21. at 197.
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risk that his dispute resolution trustmark is taken away. These are
important factors of his economic well-being, since a damaged
reputation, determined by negative feedback and the loss of the
trustmark, means a decrease of both the number of potential
transactions and the average value of bids placed to conclude the
transactions. Usually, a legal system intervenes with its own coercive
apparatus in a market because the reputation sanctions it provides do
not operate effectively, due to a lack of circulation of information.
120
In the present case, the legal system intervenes by resolving this
information problem, so that reputation sanctions can become
operative; it utilizes the market's own constraining apparatus. To
express this in the terms used above, the price for an eBay member not
to conform to the outcome of the dispute resolution procedure is her
standing in the eBay community of traders (social forces), and
consequently her capacity of entering into profitable transactions
(market forces). That this price is high enough to constitute a real
constraint and an effective enforcement mechanism is suggested by the
fact that the outcomes of the dispute resolution procedure reportedly
are complied with in 98 percent of cases. 121 Here again, the economic
barrier to court access is certainly as real as in the context of ICANN's
legal system. This closes off eBay's private legal system from the
public legal system. It is not that the public legal system does not seek
to apply to eBay transactions, but in the vast majority of cases it
effectively will not intervene in eBay disputes in spite of itself,
because the parties will not initiate court proceedings, which in that
kind of dispute is an essential element of the application of the rules of
the public legal system.
The current analysis has shown that both ICANN and eBay's
normative systems have their own independent institutions that
formulate, apply and enforce their rules. Hence, they have their own
jurisdictional powers with regard to prescription, adjudication and
enforcement. This, in principle, earmarks them as legal systems.
Nonetheless, what remains to be done in order to ground their
juridicity is to confront them with legal positivism. The importance of
this confrontation is that legal positivism is the most restrictive
account of law; it acknowledges the least places where law may be
found. In other words, it is the most stringent test of juridicity. The
following section expounds upon this confrontation, concluding that
the test set by legal positivism - that legal systems need to be
comprehensive, territorially exclusive and supreme, which all are
requirements leading to the usual understanding that positivism admits
only of state law - is misplaced and that the examples of non-state law
identified in this Article constitute prime opportunities to further crack
open such a restrictive approach of law.
120 See, e.g., MARMOR, supra note 67, at 45.
121 See Grailf-Peter Calliess, Online Dispute Resolution: Consumer Redress in a
Global Marketplace, 7 GERMAN L.J. 647, 653 (2006).
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V. NON-COMPREHENSIVE, NON-EXCLUSIVE AND NON-SUPREME LEGAL
SYSTEMS
It is frequently argued that legal systems, in order to be legal
systems, must display the features of virtual comprehensiveness of
their regulatory scope, of territorial exclusiveness and of supremacy. If
one of these features is indeed essential, then the legal systems
envisaged in this Article would fail as legal systems. Their regulatory
scope is very narrow, they overlap with a large number of national
legal systems, and they do not claim supremacy over public legal
systems.
The feature of virtual comprehensiveness means that law, in
order to be law, must claim authority to intervene in all facets of its
addressees' lives. It does not mean that law must actually regulate all
aspects of life, it is only about claiming the authority to do so. Joseph
Raz, for instance, maintains that legal systems "claim authority to
regulate any type of behavior" and that they "do not acknowledge any
limitation of the spheres of behavior which they claim authority to
regulate;" one element that sets legal systems apart from other
normative systems is that the former "claim such an authority [to
regulate all forms of behavior], whereas other systems do not claim
it.",122 Matthew Kramer argues that if a normative system does not
claim to rule over "virtually all aspects of social and individual life in
a given region," if its norms do not "encompass most aspects of human
life," then "they do not together constitute a full-blown legal
system."123 Indeed, "the regulatory sway of a full-fledged legal system
must encompass most aspects of life (even if that regulatory sway is
not actively exercised in regard to some aspects)."'
124
Territorial exclusiveness means that there cannot be two legal
systems that regulate one and the same portion of territory. There
cannot be, the assertion goes, legal systems within or across legal
systems: a population cannot be governed by several legal systems at a
time. Matthew Kramer, for instance, resists the idea that "two
conflicting legal systems reign over a single portion of territory,"
125
while Hans Kelsen argues that "no one can serve two masters." 126 This
is meant in the sense that "a system of norms can only be valid if the
validity of all other systems of norms with the same sphere of validity
has been excluded." 127 This is also known as the monistic conception
of law, as opposed to legal pluralism: law only would exist as law in
122 RAZ, supra note 9, at 150 51.
123 KRAMER, IN DEFENSE, supra note 12, at 97.
124 Id. at 98.
125 Id at 96.
126 KELSEN, supra note 82, at 329.
127 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 410 (1949).
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the form of a single and all-encompassing system. 2 8 With regard to
private normative systems, this position leads to the view that
Either the phenomena depicted as forming another body
of law are taken into consideration by the overall
system, which takes over the whole; or the phenomena
of an alleged other body of law remain outside, not
integrated into the system . . . and cannot be truly
classified as law.
129
One, and only one, legal system could thus reign over any portion of
territory. Non-state law would only be able to exist in stateless
territories.
Law's purported claim to supremacy means that each legal
system recognizes no higher authority within its sphere of application,
that it is the highest normative order with respect to its subject-
community and that it "claims authority to regulate the setting up and
application of other institutionalized systems by its subject-
community." 130 Law, to be law, would in this approach have to make a
claim to reign alone like a Leviathan, with no limits within its territory
but self-imposed ones. It would be the "final arbitrator of its own
domain."'
13 1
The three features are sometimes claimed to be interdependent.
Law's claim to supremacy is sometimes viewed as one side of the coin
of which comprehensiveness is the other. The argument is that a
normative system would not be able to claim authority to regulate all
aspects of life with no external limit without at the same time claiming
to be the highest normative order. 132  Supremacy and
comprehensiveness would furthermore directly imply the claim to
exclusiveness, to exclude all other legal systems on the same territory.
As Joseph Raz writes: "[s]ince all legal systems claim to be supreme
with respect to their subject-community, none can acknowledge any
claim to supremacy over the same community which may be made by
another legal system." 133 With law's claim to supremacy, as Hans
Kelsen would say, "a monistic construction is inevitable."'
' 34
These relations of entailment do not seem to be correct. The
feature of comprehensiveness may only be understood realistically as
128 See, e.g., BOBBIO, supra note 35, at 186.
I" JEAN CARBONNIER, SOCIOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 213 (1972).
130 RAZ, supra note 9, at 151.
131 As explained by Marmor, who does not share the view, in MARMOR, supra note
67, at 39 42.
112 See, e.g., id at 39.
133 RAZ, supra note 9, at 152.
134 KELSEN, supra note 82, at 333.
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virtual comprehensiveness, in the sense not only of the feature being a
claim to authority rather than an actual exercise thereof, but also in the
sense of it being understood as widely ranging as opposed to all-
encompassing. The range of life's facets that law typically claims
authority to rule over is very broad, but it sometimes does not cover
every facet of life; it is about a very large number of behaviors, but not
necessarily all behavior. This is evidenced in federal systems where
observation shows two wide-ranging but not all-encompassing co-
occurrent legal systems. Certain behaviors are regulated by the federal
system, others by the legal systems of the federated entities. The latter
do acknowledge limitations, set by the federal legal system, of the
spheres of behavior they claim authority to regulate. The systems of
the federated entities are not the highest normative orders but they still
claim a wide-ranging authority to regulate.
Federal legal systems further show that supremacy and territorial
exclusiveness are not essential properties of a legal system. Federated
entities typically each operate their own legal system, while being
constitutionally subordinate to federal law in conflict with it. Hence,
the former are not supreme and make no claim to this effect. As to
territorial exclusiveness, the fact that a federal legal system and
federated legal systems are co-occurrent on one and the same territory
shows that there are instances where this feature is not present. It
therefore cannot be an essential feature, as essential features are
"present whenever and wherever law exists" and are "invariant in that
every legal system is characterized by them."'
3 5
These observations are further confirmed if we adopt a historical
perspective. Lon Fuller reminds us that
Historically dual and triple systems have functioned
without serious friction, and when conflict has arisen it
has often been solved by some kind of voluntary
accommodation. This happened in England when the
common law courts began to absorb into their own
system many of the rules developed by the courts of the
law merchant.... 
136
There were, historically, non-exclusive legal systems. Andrei Marmor
further recalls that in the Middle Ages "positive law was seen as an
exception to customs, traditions, religion, and in general, social
practices long in force[, t]hus the law, as a relatively exceptional
normative source, could only intervene within the narrow space left
open by these other normative sources."' 137 Such legal systems,
Marmor explains, "had no... claims to supremacy."
138
135 KRAMER, OBJECTIVITY, supra note 11, at 102.
136 FULLER, supra note 10, at 124.
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As to the feature of virtual comprehensiveness, I believe that it is
a feature not of law but rather of the modern state. The modern
conceptions of political sovereignty as they emerged in the wake of
Bodin's Les six livres de la Republique (1576), the Peace of
Westphalia (1648) and Hobbes's Leviathan (1651) 139 comprised a
political claim to the supremacy of the state in order to impose unified
and centralized structures over separatism. Originally, nation-states
were wrestling with groups headed by feudal lords, the church and
local customs. In order to prevail in this opposition, it was necessary to
create, and later sustain, that "imagined community" that is the
nation.1 41 The nation-state, as distinguished from the state tout court, is
in this sense modernity's socially constructed equation between an
overarching community and a territory. It is the product of an
indefeasible link established for political reasons between an
"imagined community" and "imagined geographies" (the territory of
the state).
142
In order to create and sustain the nation, the modern state sought
to "transcend ethnic, religious and other cleavages in a political
construction of ample proportions, guaranteeing at least a certain level
of solidarity." 143 The goal was to achieve a "universalization of
collective life"' 144 - universal meaning here not cosmopolitan but
comprehensive in subject-matter. The purpose was to comprehensively
"colonize the lifeworld" of its citizen, as Habermas would say, 145 to
penetrate social relations and replace subjectively shared backgrounds
with objectively defined structures of social reality 146 based on a
unified "virtually universal rationality." 147 One of the instruments used
to achieve this was the public legal system of the modern state, which
thus had to be "virtually universal" or, in other words, virtually
139 See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 21,25 (5th ed. 2003).
140 See, e.g., MARMOR, supra note 67, at 40.
141 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983). See also FRIEDRICH
MEINECKE, WELTBURGERTUM AND NATIONALSTAAT 124-57 (1915); and JURGEN
HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION 62 (2001). On extreme links
between territory, ideology and community, see HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM 363 (1979). On the nation as a product of modernity, see, for
example, ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983).
142 EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 54-55 (1978). See also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE 125 (1985); ROY E.H. MELLOR, NATION, STATE, AND
TERRITORY (1989).
143 OST & VAN DE KERCHOVE, supra note 36, at 128.
144Id at 128.
145 2 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1987).
146 id.
147 OST & VAN DE KERCHOVE, supra note 36, at 127.
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comprehensive. The use of law's function of creating and sustaining a
unified community partakes of the groundwork of political sovereignty
in the modern state. In order to allow sovereignty to be
comprehensive, the legal system of the modern state had to be
comprehensive as well.
Even if virtual comprehensiveness were a feature of law, it
would have to be conceived as being limited in scope by the
underlying community's boundaries. Virtual comprehensiveness is
best understood as the claim to rule over a very large proportion of
those facets of life that occur within a community. Admittedly,
sociability traditionally was almost exclusively territory based, rooted
in proximity. 148 It used to be that groups only would form within
geographically determined areas. However, with the development of
information technologies, sociability gradually evolved, giving rise
with increasing frequency to delocalized communities. 149 They
emerged because the means to form communities is communication,
150
and, with the rise of the Internet, communication has become almost
entirely independent of geography. This is what Paul Virilio, for
instance, calls "social tele-localness."' 151 It is the idea that, by means of
electronic communication, groups increasingly engage in societal
relationships, progressively creating bonds that eventually form
communities, almost irrespectively of their geographical localization.
Ever more frequently, what matters is not the territorial proximity
between people but the "selective ties" that members of such
"communities of choice," as sociologist Manuel Castells puts it,
purposefully develop, such ties being typically based on common
affinities, interests and goals.1 52 Those communities are no longer
proximity based, but subject-matter centered. Their boundaries are no
longer dependent on territory, but on specific activities. In such cases,
virtual comprehensiveness would mean that the legal system would
claim authority to rule over a large proportion of those behaviors that
occur in the context of such activities. In such cases, virtual
comprehensiveness would be restricted to relatively specific behaviors.
If we accept the idea of ubi societas, ibi ius in its conditional
form adopted here- that communities, if they evolve sufficiently to
acquire certain characteristics that we have discussed above, will
develop normative systems and then legal systems - then the current
development of deterritorialized communities seems at odds with the
148 See, e.g., MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON
INTERNET, BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 125-26 (2002).
149 See, e.g., HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY (1993); Philip
Giordano, Invoking Law as a Basis for Identity in Cyberspace, 1998 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1. 10; Beth S. Noveck. A Democracy of Groups. 10 FIRST MONDAY, no. 11
(Nov. 7. 2005), available at http://www.webcitation.org/501I2GmCD.
150 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 141, at 5 6, 36 38, 204.
151 VIRILIO, supra note 13, at 59.
152 CASTELLS, supra note 148, at 119 25.
2007-2008
41
SCHULTZ: PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEMS
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEMS
idea of virtual comprehensiveness in any other acceptation than the
one just sketched. A deterritorialized legal system that regulates only
those behaviors that relate to the shared interests or common goals of
the community's members is, by definition, non-comprehensive if we
give this concept an absolute or universal meaning (a very large
number of the facets of life generally speaking as opposed to life
within a specific community). This leaves open only one of two
solutions: either the model of a legal system is too limiting, or these
communities cannot produce legal systems, whatever their level of
self-organization, autonomy and overall development. It seems to me
that it would be unduly restrictive to deny such communities the
capacity to create law on the basis of a model of law that owes much
to conceptions of political sovereignty whose goal precisely was to
assert and establish exclusive and supreme control over a specific
portion of territory.
It must, however, be recognized that a legal system that features
the three properties addressed in this section is conceptually closer to
the epitomical public legal system of the modern state and therefore is
more clearly a legal system than those that do not. The public legal
system remains the epitome of a legal system because current legal
thinking still is very much marked by modern conceptions of political
sovereignty. These conceptions, instantiated on the plane of law,
produced the doctrine of classical legal positivism as a monistic
conception of law, 15 3 and, hence, it has appeared very natural for the
last few centuries to treat law as an all-encompassing normative order.
It has become all too tempting to think of law as having necessarily the
same characteristics as this epitomical instance of law, and thereby to
engage in what appears as an inductive fallacy. The public legal
system of the modern state simply has been so preponderantly present
that it has been obscuring all other possibilities ofjuridicity. However,
it must be kept in mind that the modern state is only a historical
creation 154 and that law predated it.155 Simon Roberts's argument that
we have come to deeply associate law with government and that to
claim the existence of non-state legal systems would be contrary to the
way we now think of law, that it would run afoul of "the durability of
old understandings," is convincing and sound but it inherently rejects
all attempts at an ontological understanding of what law is.156
Non-comprehensive, non-exclusive and non-supreme legal
systems thus appear perfectly admissible in theory. In practice, some
of the best examples of such systems seem to be those identified in this
Article: ICANN and eBay's legal orders.
153 See, e.g., id at 39.
1
54 
See, e.g., JOSEPH R. STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE
(1979).
155 See, e.g.. HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 49 83 (1983); BOAVENTURA
DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 21-84 (2d ed. 2002).
156 Roberts, supra note 3, passim.
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CONCLUSION
ICANN and eBay are some of the places on the Internet where
autonomous and formally organized normative systems can be found.
No doubt there are others, and no doubt they all show more or less
flagrant differences with state law. My aim in this Article has been to
advertise those two examples as an invitation to seriously consider the
recognition of such systems as legal systems.
Such a recognition seeks to serve two purposes. First, it may
further the understanding of power structures in a world where state
law has a decreased capacity to code power. Law is, among other
things, an instrumentality of power. Not to recognize the presence of
law in a specific field easily may lead to not fully acknowledging the
structures of power prevalent there and hence to not setting appropriate
standards of regulatory quality. Second, such a recognition may further
the understanding of the regulation of the Internet. In particular, it may
help overcome the common misconception that there is such a thing as
a global comprehensive governance of cyberspace, with a multitude of
actors all contributing to a single spread-out web of normativity, a
single global normative soup. 157 Cyberspace is carved up into different
spheres of normativity, some of which are connected only remotely to
other normative systems. It also may help overcome the opposite
misconception that activities carried out over the Internet simply are a
slight variation of offline activities, and that conduct is being shaped in
the same fashion in both contexts.
More fundamentally, cyberspace is a field of experimentation for
legal theory that is particularly alive and responsive. New communities
are being formed and new modalities of "governmentality," as
Foucault would say, are being tested there. 158 Law, there, takes on new
structures, or maybe recovers some old ones. To echo Lawrence
Lessig's conclusion to his revered article The Law of the Horse - What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, "[a]t the centre of any lesson about cyberspace
is an understanding of the role of law." 159 Indeed, it is with regard to
the modalities of law, and thus with regard to the forms that legal
systems can take, that cyberspace may teach its most valuable lessons.
157 This is in substance the position behind the concept of the lex electronica. See
supra note 1.
158 Governmentality is. in the essence, the art of government. See, e.g., THE
FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY (Graham Burchell et al. eds.,
1991).
159 Lawrence Lessig. The Law of the Horse What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 548 (1999).
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